The term 'medical model' is frequently used The term 'medical model' is frequently used in psychiatry with denigration, suggesting in psychiatry with denigration, suggesting that its methods are paternalistic, inhumane that its methods are paternalistic, inhumane and reductionist. This view has influenced and reductionist. This view has influenced mental health organisations, which in mental health organisations, which in certain areas advocate a departure from certain areas advocate a departure from the medical model, and contributes to the the medical model, and contributes to the difficulties in leadership being played out difficulties in leadership being played out between politicians, professionals and between politicians, professionals and patients. The view has some support from patients. The view has some support from within psychiatry (with some psychiatrists within psychiatry (with some psychiatrists being apologists), from the 1960s' anti-being apologists), from the 1960s' antipsychiatry movement, as well as from some psychiatry movement, as well as from some in the recovery movement (Ralph in the recovery movement (Ralph et al et al, , 2002) . Although diversity is healthy, it 2002). Although diversity is healthy, it may fuel unproductive rivalry to be recog-may fuel unproductive rivalry to be recognised as nised as the the therapeutic agent between therapeutic agent between divergent therapies and agencies. divergent therapies and agencies.
WHAT IS CURRENTLY MEANT WHAT IS CURRENTLY MEANT BY THE MEDICAL MODEL? BY THE MEDICAL MODEL?
There are various definitions. Clare (1980) There are various definitions. Clare (1980) suggested that it is a scientific process in-suggested that it is a scientific process involving observation, description and differ-volving observation, description and differentiation, which moves from recognising and entiation, which moves from recognising and treating symptoms to identifying disease treating symptoms to identifying disease aetiologies and developing specific treat-aetiologies and developing specific treatments. Wikipedia, the internet encyclopedia, ments. Wikipedia, the internet encyclopedia, currently defines it as 'the predominant currently defines it as 'the predominant Western approach to illness, the body being Western approach to illness, the body being a complex mechanism, with illness under-a complex mechanism, with illness understood in terms of causation and remediation, stood in terms of causation and remediation, in contrast to holistic, and social models'. in contrast to holistic, and social models'. The Disabled People's Movement (http:// The Disabled People's Movement (http:// www.bfi.org.uk/education/teaching/disability/ www.bfi.org.uk/education/teaching/disability/ thinking/medical.html) believes that it is thinking/medical.html) believes that it is based on a false notion of 'normality', with based on a false notion of 'normality', with people being judged on what they cannot people being judged on what they cannot do. do. They believe that it sees people with They believe that it sees people with disabilities as the problem, focusing on disabilities as the problem, focusing on impairment, provoking fear and patronis-impairment, provoking fear and patronising attitudes, the powerful doctor shutting ing attitudes, the powerful doctor shutting the 'disabled' away. These definitions the 'disabled' away. These definitions potentially combine potentially combine to form the caricature to form the caricature of a reductionist, of a reductionist, mechanistic, disability-mechanistic, disabilityenhancing approach, taken by powerful enhancing approach, taken by powerful doctors towards patients. doctors towards patients.
Matters are aggravated in psychiatry Matters are aggravated in psychiatry because of the Descartian divide between because of the Descartian divide between biological and psychosocial psychiatry. biological and psychosocial psychiatry. Biological psychiatry is assumed to be Biological psychiatry is assumed to be mechanistic and reductionist, exclusively mechanistic and reductionist, exclusively concerned with neuroimaging, genetics concerned with neuroimaging, genetics and medication. Psychosocial psychiatry, and medication. Psychosocial psychiatry, championed as being empowering, humane championed as being empowering, humane and holistic, is regarded as the antithesis and holistic, is regarded as the antithesis and aligns itself to models such as Engel's and aligns itself to models such as Engel's (1977 Engel's ( ). (1977 .
IS BIOLOGICAL REALLY IS BIOLOGICAL REALLY REDUCTIONISTIC ? REDUCTIONISTIC ?
The idea that the 'biological' is reductionist The idea that the 'biological' is reductionist and undesirable leads to curious contra-and undesirable leads to curious contradictions. The negative view of psychiatric dictions. The negative view of psychiatric drugs contrasts with views of drugs in other drugs contrasts with views of drugs in other specialties or alternatives such as homoeo-specialties or alternatives such as homoeopathy. The parallel assumption that psy-pathy. The parallel assumption that psychosocial treatments are without risk, are chosocial treatments are without risk, are holistic and the treatments of choice holistic and the treatments of choice ignores evidence that some psychological ignores evidence that some psychological treatments can cause damage (Rose treatments can cause damage (Rose et al et al, , 2002) . Furthermore, psychological treat-2002). Furthermore, psychological treatments may work synergistically with drugs ments may work synergistically with drugs (Keller (Keller et al et al, 2000) . In the extreme, advo-, 2000). In the extreme, advocating exclusive psychological approaches cating exclusive psychological approaches amounts to 'psychological reductionism' amounts to 'psychological reductionism' and could harm patients by denying them and could harm patients by denying them other effective treatments. other effective treatments.
Biological explanations and treatments
Biological explanations and treatments for diseases have helped to reduce fear, for diseases have helped to reduce fear, superstition and stigma, and to increase superstition and stigma, and to increase understanding, hope and humane methods understanding, hope and humane methods of treatment (Tallis, 2004) . For example, of treatment (Tallis, 2004) . For example, epilepsy is now better understood as a epilepsy is now better understood as a medical condition, which has reduced the medical condition, which has reduced the perception of it being a fearful phenomenon perception of it being a fearful phenomenon of demonic possession. Logically a biologi-of demonic possession. Logically a biological perspective in psychiatry should do the cal perspective in psychiatry should do the same. same.
Neuroscience demonstrates that biolo-Neuroscience demonstrates that biological, social and psychological experiences gical, social and psychological experiences translate into changes in brain structure translate into changes in brain structure and function. Childhood sexual abuse and function. Childhood sexual abuse (Teicher, 2000) , personality trait differences (Teicher, 2000) , personality trait differences (Breier (Breier et al et al, 1998) , and psychological and , 1998), and psychological and pharmacological treatments (Seminowicz pharmacological treatments (Seminowicz et al et al, 2004) have all been associated with , 2004) have all been associated with differences in discrete brain systems, differences in discrete brain systems, making it difficult to maintain the mind-making it difficult to maintain the mindbody split, and offering a potential explana-body split, and offering a potential explanation for how bio-psychosocial treatments tion for how bio-psychosocial treatments actually work. actually work.
We suggest that the difficulty lies in We suggest that the difficulty lies in accepting that the human mind is also bio-accepting that the human mind is also biological. This challenges cherished assump-logical. This challenges cherished assumptions about our self-attributed uniqueness tions about our self-attributed uniqueness and the specialness of 'the mind'. As Tallis and the specialness of 'the mind'. As Tallis (2004) comments, regarding one's body as (2004) comments, regarding one's body as part of oneself but also objectively is part of oneself but also objectively is difficult. How much more difficult is it to difficult. How much more difficult is it to accept that what we experience as ourselves accept that what we experience as ourselves can be understood in terms of brain func-can be understood in terms of brain function? Banishing biology to reductionism tion? Banishing biology to reductionism merely defends our need to preserve the merely defends our need to preserve the sanctity of 'the mind'. sanctity of 'the mind'.
A CONTEMPORARY A CONTEMPORARY DEFINITION OF THE MEDICAL DEFINITION OF THE MEDICAL MODEL MODEL
We believe that we need a simple definition We believe that we need a simple definition of the medical model, which incorporates of the medical model, which incorporates medicine's fundamental ideals, to facilitate medicine's fundamental ideals, to facilitate clarity and precision, without denying its clarity and precision, without denying its shortcomings. We propose that the 'medi-shortcomings. We propose that the 'medical model' is a process whereby, informed cal model' is a process whereby, informed by the best available evidence, doctors by the best available evidence, doctors advise on, coordinate or deliver inter-advise on, coordinate or deliver interventions for health improvement. It can be ventions for health improvement. It can be summarily stated as 'does it work?' summarily stated as 'does it work?'
Face validity Face validity
Evidence has always been at the core of Evidence has always been at the core of the 'medical model', encapsulated in the 'medical model', encapsulated in Hippocrates' diktat 'first, do no harm'. This Hippocrates' diktat 'first, do no harm'. This assumes that the doctor has specific assumes that the doctor has specific knowledge and expertise (evidence) that knowledge and expertise (evidence) that (Imrie & Ramey, 2001) , there is no call to abandon evidence and rely on faith or in-abandon evidence and rely on faith or instinct alone. Practice is also increasingly stinct alone. Practice is also increasingly determined by guidelines, with legal conse-determined by guidelines, with legal consequences for not doing so. We suggest that quences for not doing so. We suggest that patients are not primarily concerned with patients are not primarily concerned with a treatment's ideological background but a treatment's ideological background but are more interested in what helps and what are more interested in what helps and what harms. Patients want us to provide a harms. Patients want us to provide a balanced view to enable them to decide. balanced view to enable them to decide.
Ideology and assumption free Ideology and assumption free
The history of psychiatry well illustrates the The history of psychiatry well illustrates the perils of treatment by assumption or ideol-perils of treatment by assumption or ideology. Our definition avoids invoking either ogy. Our definition avoids invoking either 'psychological' or 'biological' ideologies. 'psychological' or 'biological' ideologies. Although some people debate whether em-Although some people debate whether empiricism is reasonable, we contend that piricism is reasonable, we contend that ideologies have fruitlessly divided pharm-ideologies have fruitlessly divided pharmacology and psychotherapy (as well as psy-acology and psychotherapy (as well as psychotherapies themselves). How 'it works' is chotherapies themselves). How 'it works' is important but is secondary to defining important but is secondary to defining 'what works'. Not knowing how it works 'what works'. Not knowing how it works does not invalidate good evidence: vitamins does not invalidate good evidence: vitamins were undiscovered when Lind conducted were undiscovered when Lind conducted his scurvy trial (Bartholemew, 2002) . Evi-his scurvy trial (Bartholemew, 2002) . Evidence, then, is the first critical step in dence, then, is the first critical step in elucidating what works and helps to elucidating what works and helps to validate our bio-psychosocial treatments, validate our bio-psychosocial treatments, defining their dangers and efficacy. defining their dangers and efficacy.
Scrutiny of interventions Scrutiny of interventions
The model requires all interventions to be The model requires all interventions to be scrutinised using the same methodology. scrutinised using the same methodology. As each intervention is understood on its As each intervention is understood on its own merits, protagonists need to justify own merits, protagonists need to justify their treatment with standard evidence their treatment with standard evidence and not ideology. It is an unfair assumption and not ideology. It is an unfair assumption that 'mind' treatments are beyond scrutiny that 'mind' treatments are beyond scrutiny and that some treatments are somehow and that some treatments are somehow innately 'better' than others. Such scrutiny innately 'better' than others. Such scrutiny is particularly important when public is particularly important when public money funds interventions (e.g. in the money funds interventions (e.g. in the National Health Service). Indeed, the bene-National Health Service). Indeed, the benefit of the medical model is that it justifies fit of the medical model is that it justifies expanding non-pharmacological as well as expanding non-pharmacological as well as drug treatments. drug treatments.
THE MEDICAL MODEL THE MEDICAL MODEL AND POWER AND POWER
We do not believe that the medical model is We do not believe that the medical model is simply about doctors' apparent power. The simply about doctors' apparent power. The relationship between a patient and their relationship between a patient and their doctor is complex. Patients initially seek a doctor is complex. Patients initially seek a doctor because they believe this may be use-doctor because they believe this may be useful, which could be seen as conferring ful, which could be seen as conferring power to the doctor. However, getting power to the doctor. However, getting better has always been an active process in-better has always been an active process involving seeking help, evaluating options volving seeking help, evaluating options and making decisions about treatments. and making decisions about treatments. Patients do choose not to engage with treat-Patients do choose not to engage with treatment (e.g. only half of patients collect their ment (e.g. only half of patients collect their prescribed medications), and may sabotage prescribed medications), and may sabotage their own care. When vulnerable, people re-their own care. When vulnerable, people respond in various ways which are probably spond in various ways which are probably influenced by their experience of life: some influenced by their experience of life: some feel powerless whereas others are moti-feel powerless whereas others are motivated. Patient behaviours and expectations vated. Patient behaviours and expectations are not passive -if they were, patients are not passive -if they were, patients would meekly stop smoking, curb their would meekly stop smoking, curb their alcohol intake and have cervical smears! alcohol intake and have cervical smears! The doctor's task then The doctor's task then is to advise on the is to advise on the most effective intervention, the patient's most effective intervention, the patient's task being to decide and act on that advice task being to decide and act on that advice while making sense of complex and con-while making sense of complex and conflicting emotions. 'Patient empowerment', flicting emotions. 'Patient empowerment', therefore, has little to do with rescuing therefore, has little to do with rescuing patients from the medical model. In this patients from the medical model. In this context, Engel's psychosocial model does context, Engel's psychosocial model does not contradict the 'medical model' but not contradict the 'medical model' but rather enhances it. rather enhances it.
FUTURE OF THE MEDICAL FUTURE OF THE MEDICAL MODEL IN PSYCHIATRY MODEL IN PSYCHIATRY
We believe that it is important to adhere to We believe that it is important to adhere to the medical model as we have defined it the medical model as we have defined it ('does it work?'). If we do not we may lose ('does it work?'). If we do not we may lose our hard-earned gains in defining effective our hard-earned gains in defining effective psychiatric treatments. We must continue psychiatric treatments. We must continue to gather quality evidence in order to to gather quality evidence in order to establish which interventions work. This establish which interventions work. This may be particularly challenging when de-may be particularly challenging when defining which elements of psychosocial treat-fining which elements of psychosocial treatments are effective. This is critical to ments are effective. This is critical to improve the credibility of psychiatry as a improve the credibility of psychiatry as a medical specialty, which has been attacked medical specialty, which has been attacked because psychiatric treatments are multi-because psychiatric treatments are multidimensional. dimensional.
We also contend that the well-informed We also contend that the well-informed psychiatrist who uses the medical model psychiatrist who uses the medical model is ideally positioned to challenge those is ideally positioned to challenge those who engage on both sides of Descartian who engage on both sides of Descartian extremism. We need to acknowledge that extremism. We need to acknowledge that our medical approach may sit uncom-our medical approach may sit uncomfortably with other doctors and mental fortably with other doctors and mental health professionals, who may not per-health professionals, who may not perceive that psychosocial factors and inter-ceive that psychosocial factors and interventions translate into biology. However, ventions translate into biology. However, we should use and encourage the devel-we should use and encourage the developments in neuroscience, which blur opments in neuroscience, which blur the distinction between mind and brain the distinction between mind and brain and which may demonstrate how bio-and which may demonstrate how biopsychosocial interventions actually work. psychosocial interventions actually work. This offers the potential to bring ration-This offers the potential to bring rationality, specificity and validity to our inter-ality, specificity and validity to our interventions.
ventions.
Most importantly, we should not apol-Most importantly, we should not apologise for using the medical model. Instead, ogise for using the medical model. Instead, we should challenge those who use it as a we should challenge those who use it as a professional attack and question what is professional attack and question what is being criticised. We should not believe that being criticised. We should not believe that the medical model is only about doctors' the medical model is only about doctors' powers, but remind ourselves that patients powers, but remind ourselves that patients are active participants in the interaction. are active participants in the interaction. Medicine has always been about helping Medicine has always been about helping patients 'take charge' of their recovery by patients 'take charge' of their recovery by whatever means available. whatever means available.
Finally, we should rigorously challenge Finally, we should rigorously challenge those who regard the psychiatrist as a uni-those who regard the psychiatrist as a unidimensional pharmacologist and reduction-dimensional pharmacologist and reductionist. Psychiatrists' training involves the use ist. Psychiatrists' training involves the use of biological, social and psychological of biological, social and psychological treatments, a fact recognised in statute treatments, a fact recognised in statute (e.g. the Mental Health (Care and Treat-(e.g. the Mental Health (Care and Treatment) (Scotland) Act 2003). Thus, we ment) (Scotland) Act 2003). Thus, we should highlight what is undoubtedly psy-should highlight what is undoubtedly psychiatry's best asset (an area that the public chiatry's best asset (an area that the public may accuse our specialist colleagues of may accuse our specialist colleagues of lacking): that of being a medical specialty lacking): that of being a medical specialty in which the specialist understands and uses in which the specialist understands and uses the holistic bio-psychosocial approach the holistic bio-psychosocial approach. . Psychological debriefing for preventing post traumatic Psychological debriefing for preventing post traumatic stress disorder (PTSD). stress disorder (PTSD). Cochrane Database of Systematic Cochrane Database of Systematic Reviews Reviews, issue 2, CD000560.
, issue 2, CD000560. . Atlantic Books.
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